Fighting the French veto
By Hans Schauer
First Secretary 1965-1970
Herbert Blankenhorn was one of the outstanding German postwar Ambassadors and Head of our London Embassy at an important time for Anglo-German and British-European relations, when Great Britain cut herself off from her colonial past East of Suez and turned decisively towards Europe. This change of policy basically preoccupied our bi-lateral relations in the Blankenhorn era. When the Conservative Government's negotiations to join the Community foundered on de Gaulle's veto (1961-1963), the Labour Government under Wilson resolved to have another go. Even before Wilson's remarkable election victory in 1966 soundings had been taken. The Foreign Secretary George Brown made a speech in Stockholm in March of that year (if I remember rightly) in which the European stance of the future Labour Government was clearly indicated. Blankenhorn, who had a gift for sensing future political developments, asked me to send the speech verbatim to Bonn. We happened, moreover, to be proved right in our prediction of Wilson's victory. When I wanted to write to Bonn, basing myself on careful research, that the Labour majority would be about 70, Blankenhorn, having dined the previous evening with Cecil King of the Daily Mirror, told me I could safely put about 100. It turned out to be 93.
In the Queen's Speech on the new Government's policy, Great Britain's readiness to join the Community under the right conditions was clearly expressed. When the German Chancellor, Prof. Ludwig Erhard, visited London in May 1966, NATO was the main theme of the talks because of the French decision to be "of but not in it". Britain's wish to join the Community was, however, a matter of equal importance. The application was made in May 1967 and was again rejected by de Gaulle at a press conference. But Great Britain did not give up. Before the rejection, Chancellor Kiesinger who had succeeded Erhard visited London; the European Community again was the central theme. Subsequently our mediation was repeatedly asked for. The British often thought that we were not decisive enough vis-à-vis the French in support of British entry. Only in 1969, Pompidou was prepared to support Britain's move and this almost coincided with Blankenhorn's departure from active diplomacy.
Ambassador Blankenhorn was, in his years (1965-1970), an indefatigable and thoughtful adviser of our Government as well as of the leading British politicians. He knew both sides well - the French and the British - and his judgment was accordingly weighty. Later, already in retirement, he visited us in our Washington Embassy as a member of the Executive Council of UNESCO, and I asked him whether he thought that we had been right in supporting Britain's entry. He had no doubt about it. We were agreed that Europe needs Britain as much as Britain needs Europe.
